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Mobile banking is growing at a remarkable speed around 
the world. In the process it is creating considerable 
uncertainty about the appropriate regulatory response 
to this newly emerging service. This paper sets out a 
framework for considering the design of regulation of 
mobile banking. Since it lies at the interface between 
financial services and telecoms, mobile banking also 
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raises competition policy and interoperability issues 
that are discussed in the paper. Finally, by unbundling 
payments services into its component parts, mobile 
banking provides important lessons for the design of 
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1.  Introduction 
A financial revolution is in progress.  It is not happening under the skyscrapers of New York or 
on the streets of London.  It is not taking place in Beijing or Mumbai but in the slums of Nairobi 
and in the markets of Kisumu (Mas, 2010).  It is not the micro-lending with which developing 
and emerging markets are associated but something at the other end of the financial spectrum in 
the traditionally least exciting part of the financial system - payments.  Notwithstanding this, it 
has  fundamental  implications  for  financial  development  and  financial  inclusion,  for  our 
understanding of financial systems, and for their regulation and supervision.   
The revolution is mobile banking – the use of mobile phones to make financial transactions.  
Mobile money or branchless banking schemes are sprouting across the world.  According to the 
deployment tracker of the GSM Association, one scheme was launched in 2001.   By 2006, there 
were just 10 globally but the success of M-PESA in Kenya, which was launched in 2007, appears 
to have provided added impetus.  25 schemes started in 2009 and 38 in 2010.  2011 is on course 
for over 50 deployments.   By the end of 2011 over 140 mobile money ventures will be operating 
globally, up from 95 currently.  The current boom is focused on Africa with 45 schemes so far, 
followed by Asia and the Pacific with 25 in operation and Latin America with 12. 
The verdict on the viability of the schemes is still out.  One success currently stands out: M-
PESA in Kenya signed up over 50 percent of all adults in the nation in less than 4 years to a 
mobile phone-based retail payment system.  Brazil established “correspondent banking” around 
2000.  Over 95,000 shops across the country provided basic facilities for customers to make 
payments using a Point-of-Sale (POS) device, not a mobile phone.  While Brazil is, next to 
Kenya, the country with the most far-reaching retail payment scheme, the financial viability of 












The wave of experiments with mobile schemes that is currently sweeping the globe focuses 
mostly  on  payment  transactions.    Based  on  M-PESA’s  record,  this  promises  to  reach  more 
unbanked customers than previous micro-finance ventures.  Most schemes use mobile phones as 
the device to communicate with an account provider.  Some use Point-of-Sale (POS) devices in 
conjunction with magnetic stripe cards, mostly in Latin America; some use both phones and POS 
devices, for example WIZZIT in South Africa and Smart in the Philippines.    
The account provider may be a bank, but more and more it is a telecommunications company 
and, in rare cases, a third party, for example, Celpay in Zambia.  Most account providers effect 
payments  among the participants  within their scheme. A few schemes interconnect  different 
account providers, mostly banks to date.  New interconnection schemes that allow payments to 
be made between different types of account providers are being tested. 
The new payment schemes bring people from the cash economy into modern systems of book-
entry money that may be recorded electronically or on paper, sometimes both in one system.  A 
key requirement for success is to have retail outlets that change cash for book-entry money.  So-
called “cash-in/cash-out” services are provided sometimes by shops that operate independent of 
bank branches or by bank branches.  Many shops are branded by a single mobile money scheme, 
some offer services for several schemes.   The success of any scheme is critically dependent on 
finding the right  business  model that makes  the retail  providers of cash-in/cash-out  services 
profitable.  Only one scheme, M-PESA, appears so far to have achieved operational profitability.  
For most schemes it is too early to tell.  
All in all, there is no set way to classify the new experiments by type of institution. Each scheme 
tends to add a new twist and may combine functions and players in new ways.  It is thus most 
helpful  to  analyze  issues  by  service  provided.    M-PESA  happens  to  provide  a  convenient 
example to discuss the plethora of issues that arise. 











  it provides financial services in otherwise unbanked locations; 
  it raises significant regulatory and competition policy issues; 
  by unbundling and disaggregating financial services, it gives fundamental conceptual 
insights into the nature of these services. 
Information  and  communication  technologies  (ICT)  fuel  the  greatest  wave  of  technical 
innovation currently spreading across the globe, affecting new areas of social and economic 
activity.    Unsurprisingly,  financial  businesses  everywhere  have  been  in  the  throes  of 
organizational changes and innovation based on new possibilities opened up by ICT. Money, 
after all, is “just” information about who owes what to whom. Much innovation happens in 
advanced  economies  yet  new  technology  has  the  potential  to  unleash  radical  change  in 
developing economies.   
These new technologies are leapfrogging the ones that exist in developed economies, particularly 
when they help to solve problems arising from weak institutional infrastructure.  M-PESA in 
Kenya provides the prominent example at this time.  In 2006, instigated by the UK’s Department 
for  International  Development  (DFID)  in  conjunction  with  staff  at  Vodafone,  the  Kenyan 
Vodafone  subsidiary,  Safaricom,  experimented  with  the  use  of  mobile  phones  to  support 
microfinance.    Originally,  the  idea  was  to  facilitate  loan  payments  and  repayments  under 
microcredit  schemes.    As  Safaricom  explored  the  scheme,  the  company  developed  a  new 
business proposition that focused on payment and small saving services with the slogan “send 
money home”.   
Launched in March 2007, the payment and saving service signed up over 50 percent of adult 
Kenyans by the end of 2010.  The annual number of payment transactions rose to exceed that of 
Western Union globally and now accounts for about 58 percent of the number of electronic 
payments in Kenya.  The system allows users to send or withdraw money at over 23,000 retail 
outlets compared with approximately 1,000 bank branches.  The absolute amounts are very small 
reflecting the income level of the users with average savings of around $3











innovation  has  profound  implications  for  financial  inclusion  and  the  provision  of  financial 
services to underserved citizens.   Its significance stems not just from the reduced costs of access 
to  cash  and  means  of  payments  which  are  the  most  direct  effects  of  mobile  banking  for 
communities that previously had no or expensive access to formal means of exchange.  It also 
provides communities with access to a network of individuals, merchants and companies from 
which they were previously excluded.  The potential for reaching providers of such services as 
health insurance, savings and lending products has increased substantially since the advent of 
mobile banking in Kenya
3.   
A further feature of mobile banking is the way in which it facilitates the development of relations 
of trust where previously there was no basis for it.  In particular, mobile banking pro vides an 
instantaneous  and  traceable  record  of  transactions  that  were  otherwise  anonymous  and 
unverifiable through cash.  For example, mobile banking permits the keeping of records and 
accounts on payments that contribute over a period to the total cost of  a delivery of a service.  
Regular savings for education and health services become possible in a way previously difficult 
or expensive to monitor. 
Currently policymakers and regulators in countries ranging from Namibia to Indonesia, from 
Mexico to the Philippines and from Kenya to Pakistan are drafting regulations for the era of 
mobile money.  They struggle with adapting banking regulation to mobile banking.  Yet, little 
thinking has been developed so far about how mobile money may be different from tradit ional 
banking.    Existing  attempts  include  the  distinction  between  “bank-based”  and  “telco-based” 
mobile money schemes (Lyman et al 2008). Yet, whether a telecommunications company or a 
bank is leading the effort sheds little light on the precise risks associated with a particular mobile 
money scheme. Some basic issues have been identified such as the need to ring-fence funds of a 
mobile money scheme from that of, for example, an associated telecommunications company 
(Tarazi and Brefloff, 2010).  Yet, often it is not clear how the basic design of mobile money 
regulation might potentially differ from traditional banking regulation beyond general statements 











comprehensive and practical scheme to assess regulatory approaches to new forms of financial 
transactions  enabled  by  mobile  technology  in  poor  countries,  in  particular  in  payments  and 
savings  via  mobile  phone.    To  date,  most  analyses  of  financial  inclusion  have  remained 
aggregate in nature not drilling down into the “black box” of new business models and their 
regulatory implications.  Yet, new technology shapes business models as lower transaction costs 
allow different parts of a business to be rearranged, leading, for example, to “unbundling” of 
functions that used to be organizationally integrated into a traditional form of business, say a 
bank. As we will describe, new, separate forms of organization have emerged which manage a 
“slice of risk” that was previously embedded in a traditional financial organization.   
The  significance  of  mobile  banking  goes  well  beyond  developing  countries  and  financial 
inclusion.  By providing a clear disaggregation of the components of banking, it throws light on 
the nature of financial services in general.  In particular, it brings out the distinction between 
payments  and  banking  and  suggests  that  much  of  the  debate  on  the  reform  of  banking  in 
developed economies in relation, for example, to the separation of commercial and investment 
banking has been confused.  By identifying the different components of financial services so 
clearly, mobile banking helps to establish where the focus of regulation should lie in all financial 
systems. 
Section 2 of the paper describes the key elements of mobile banking and the way in which they 
disaggregate the components of financial transactions principally into exchanges of forms of 
money,  safe-keeping  of  money,  transportation  and  investment.    Section  3  describes  various 
alternative regulatory approaches to the risks inherent in these different components of financial 
services.  Section 4 considers the competition issues related to, on the one hand, the risk of 
monopoly abuse, and the need to retain an environment that is open to new business models on 
the other. Section 5 summarizes a basic approach that can be taken to assessing regulatory and 
competition policy implications of “mobile” payments and saving services and discusses the 
wider  implications  of  the  analysis  for  the  regulation  of  banking  and  financial  services  in 












2.  Mobile Banking and Financial Disaggregation 
M-PESA in Kenya unbundles a business of what one may call “cash merchants”
4.  It allows 
people who previously relied only on cash to store and send money by phone and to use a form 
of  book  entry  money  (BEM)  recorded  and  transmitted  electronically.    This  is  nothing 
fundamentally new for people who used banks but now poor people, just like richer ones with 
bank accounts, can transform cash into BEM and conversely BEM into cash.  Previously, people 
did this at a bank branch but most poor people either have no bank account or face lengthy trips 
to bank branches.   
Safaricom exploited the fact that most Kenyans now have mobile phones.  Users buy a SIM
5 
card with the M-PESA application for their phone.  Once signed up they have an electronic 
account and they may deposit money into it, withdraw money from it or send money from their 
account to that of another M -PESA account holder.  To deposit and withdraw , they use cash 
merchants signed up with M-PESA.  Some 23,000 such merchants now operate out of small huts, 
shacks or rooms all across the country.   
The merchants themselves invest in their own business by acquiring an M -PESA account and 
deposit money of their own into it.  Once the merchant holds electronic BEM at M -PESA, she 
can sell BEM to another person for cash.  At the same time the merchant needs to hold cash to be 
able to buy BEM from another person by selling cash.  When customers visit the cash m erchant 
to deposit money into their account they give cash and receive M -PESA’s BEM via mobile 
phones.  When they withdraw cash they transfer BEM via phones to the cash merchant’s M-
PESA account and receive cash in return.   
The cash merchants are called M-PESA “agents”.  The word agent together with the acts of 
depositing or withdrawing money suggests that merchants perform services on behalf of the 











merchants do not dispose of M-PESA’s cash or other assets like a bank branch employee does 
for a bank.  They transact with their own money – either in the form of BEM or cash.  It is a 
service equivalent to the exchange of coins for bills that is allowed to happen without bank 
regulation anywhere in the world, just like those provided by machines that exchange coins for 
bills. 
The  service  that  cash  merchants  provide  is  highly  valued  by  customers.    They  perform  the 
functions of an ATM that allows cash withdrawals and deposits. The service, often called “cash 
in/cash out”, is crucial for mobile phone based transactions without which poor people could not 
obtain the cash they need on a daily basis.  Cash merchants tend to be in close proximity to 
people  in  most  of  the  country.    In  the  slums  of  the  major  cities  in  Kenya  M-PESA  cash 
merchants maintain shops every few hundred meters.  There are no long waiting lines; they open 
early and close late like other shops in the informal markets.  Poor people can transact at these 
shops without abandoning their business for lengthy amounts of time and without the cost of 
transport that may be involved in visiting the nearest branch of a bank. 
Merchants receive compensation for their services.  In the case of M-PESA, the compensation is 
paid by the account provider out of the transaction fees charged.  The M-PESA cash merchant 
receives her compensation from M-PESA.  New proposed business models, for example, that of 
a service called ZAP promoted by the telecommunications company Airtel, intend to delegate 
payments of cash merchants to customers.  In this case, ZAP would charge for the transfer from 
one account to another and the costs of exchanging cash for BEM would be paid directly by 
customers to ZAP.  
Retail cash merchants need to maintain adequate amounts of cash and of BEM to meet customer 
demand.  They obtain this from one or more of several hundred wholesalers.  The wholesalers 
may be banks or separate cash wholesale merchants without associated banking business.  When 
retailers are short of cash or BEM they can obtain more from the wholesaler.  Demand for one 











demand (Eijkman, Kendall and Mas, 2011).  Wholesalers have higher limits on BEM stored in 
M-PESA accounts so that they can perform the cash management service for retailers.  Retailers 
typically transact at least daily with wholesalers, depositing cash or withdrawing cash depending 
on their net intake of cash. 
Traditionally, the cash merchant function has been performed by banks that provided customers 
with accounts and it was therefore subject to  banking regulation.  Now it is a free-standing 
business that does not put money of the account provider at risk.  In the case of M-PESA, the 
account provider, in turn, is not part of a bank and unlike a bank it does not use deposits to 
extend credit.  It simply stores and transfers money.  Furthermore, the cash provision function is 
beginning to move from specific in-store cash merchants to general street-based merchants.  It is 
estimated that the cost of providing exchange services through street-based cash merchants is 
approximately half that of store-based merchants (Mas, 2011). 
Beyond the supply of cash, the next stage in mobile banking is the provision of electronic means 
of exchange.  Customers can pay for goods and services directly via the exchange of BEM 
without the need for intermediating through cash.  Companies can purchase and sell supplies 
through payments made by mobile connections.  There is much debate about whether electronic 
forms of payment are likely to replace cash.  One view suggests that this is unlikely to happen in 
the immediate future partly because of the general acceptance of cash and partly because of the 
relatively  high  charges  levied  on  electronic  transfers.    However,  in  the  medium  term  the 
substitution might well occur as the cost of electronic payments falls.  
The M-PESA system as a whole has an overall holding of the net deposits from customers.  It 
could just keep this net cash received in a safe but it is required by the Central Bank of Kenya to 
invest the net balances in regulated banks for safe-keeping. Currently the Central Bank does not 
allow interest on these deposits to be paid to M-PESA depositors; instead, interest income is 
covenanted to charity.  The M-PESA system is thus compensated for net balances as if they were 











the Central Bank regulation assumes that it is better to keep the money in a bank than in a safe.  
To that extent the account provider functions as a collector of deposits for banks but it is not a 
legal part of a bank and performs no credit business that puts the depositors’ money at risk 
beyond the risk of investing in safe forms of deposits at regulated banks.   
The mobile money system that arose with M-PESA thus exemplifies several forms of unbundled 
services that have traditionally been provided by banks.  The question that this raises is what is 
the appropriate form of regulation of this service?  In order to provide an answer one needs to 
consider the appropriate regulation for each component of the payments system
6.  In the next 
section we will examine alternative forms of regulation for protecting the dif ferent components 
of the system, namely: 
Exchange of different forms of money for one another 
Storage of money for safe-keeping 
Transfer of money from one owner to another 
Investment of money. 
3.  Financial Disaggregation and Regulation 
Some functions need no more than contractual relations determined by commercial law while 
others need specific forms of regulation.  In the following we distinguish between two classes of 
regulation: 
Business conduct regulation encompasses such fields as consumer protection and anti-money 
laundering measures.  The most basic question is whether to rely purely on normal commercial 
law and the means for redress it provides, in which case buyers of services are at risk and, if hurt, 











assisted by regulators empowered to set standards for the integrity of system operations and to 
review their practice.  There may be specific disclosure rules and sanctions in case of breach of 
rules - business conduct regulation tends to have relatively well defined rules and processes with 
limited regulatory discretion.   
Prudential regulation may require more substantial discretion.  Core tools are capital adequacy 
and liquidity requirements, but also rules governing risk-taking on the asset side. For example, 
regulators may limit credit growth or require certain loan-to-value ratios.  They may have views 
on the riskiness of assets  and reflect  these in  capital  requirements  or  more directly in  rules 
governing certain asset classes.  It is a mantra of prudential regulation that it should be rule-
based as far as possible but in practice substantial discretion may be required particularly when 
assessing system-wide risks, namely macro-prudential regulation.  
 
 
Exchanging forms of money 
Most forms of money currently used fall into one of two categories:  book entry money (BEM) 
or  cash.    When  BEM  is  exchanged  for  cash,  the  parties  to  the  cash/BEM  exchange  get 
confirmation of the transfer of BEM by SMS from M-PESA and, once that information has been 
received, the exchange can proceed.  The exchange functions of mobile banking can be handled 
through normal commercial law dictating the contractual relationship between customer and cash 
merchant, between the merchant and the wholesaler and between the merchants, wholesalers and 
M-PESA.  Beyond this, the pure element of exchange does not raise financial risks requiring the 
imposition of prudential regulation; on the contrary, every effort should be made to minimize 
regulation so as to enable competing cash merchants to enter the market.  The cash merchant 
business is one where free entry is, in principle, both feasible and desirable.  The main barrier to 











provider like M-PESA, because this restricts the ability to perform cash-in/cash-out services. In 
the case of M-PESA the cash merchants also act as agent for M-PESA helping with registration 
of their accounts and performing identity checks required by anti-money laundering legislation. 
This function requires regulation related to the storage function discussed below. 
Monetary concerns arise when competing currencies  are issued by different  parties, the key 
concern being whether the monetary authorities lose control over the money supply. M-PESA is 
not  creating  money;  it  is  exchanging  one  form  of  money  (cash)  for  another  (BEM).  
Nevertheless, by facilitating the exchange and allowing transactions to occur at distance through 
mobile connections, it may affect the velocity of circulation and therefore the relation between 
the money supply and nominal output and income.  The authorities need to be aware of this and 
the likely impact of mobile banking on transactions.  However, by making transactions more 
transparent and the determination of aggregate levels of expenditure more readily measurable, 
mobile banking may make it simpler for monetary authorities to observe and measure changes in 
the velocity of circulation.  The monetary authorities may thus require the account provider, but 
not the cash merchant, to provide regular information about volume and structure of payment 
transactions as discussed below under the transfer function. 
Keeping money safe 
The traditional way of keeping money safe is to store it in a safe place (“under the mattress”) and 
guard it.  Modern financial systems allow more sophisticated ways of delegating safe-keeping 
through for example a safe-deposit box.  To facilitate transferring or investing the money, one 
can delegate safe-keeping by opening an account with an account provider which traditionally 
has been a bank account but could be an account provided by a non-bank such as M-PESA.  A 
record needs to be created which can either be paper-based or electronic that establishes who 
owns the account and how access is gained to the account.  In addition, an account requires rules 
on how the records are maintained and how the owner is informed about transactions and the 











The key to any safe-keeping function is regulation that assures the integrity of the system and 
requires procedures to be subject to audit (Makin, 2009). Back-up systems are needed to ensure 
that account information can be recovered in case of physical destruction or theft.  For cases such 
as M-PESA, the accounts that contain deposits from customers need to be kept separate from the 
accounts  of  Safaricom,  even  though  M-PESA  is  not  a  separate  company.    As  it  happens 
Safaricom  created  a  special  trust  to  safeguard  the  accounts  and  it  is  important  that  strict 
separation  is  maintained  between  the  accounts  of  M-PESA  and  Safaricom  so  that  the 
custodianship function is kept distinct from the operations of Safaricom.  The records associated 
with the holding of accounts facilitate the imposition of anti-money laundering (AML) regulation 
(Chatain, Zerzan, Noor, Dannaoui and de Koker, 2011). 
In the case of M-PESA the cash merchants perform a function related to safe-keeping, namely 
registration of the account.  They establish the identity of the owner, process the request for 
account opening and perform checks required by AML regulation.  They are thus subject to more 
regulation than is required for the pure cash merchant function.  This means that M-PESA, the 
“safe-keeper”, takes on responsibility to train account openers in requisite procedures like know-
your-customer  protocols  required  by  AML  regulation  and  to  supervise  implementation.    In 
principle, however, there is no reason why the account opening function needs to be bundled 
with the cash merchant function
7.  There could also be different tiers of cash merchants.  M -
PESA today distinguishes between wholesalers and retail agents with different limits on their 
accounts.  There might also be pure cash merchants with no responsibility for registration, such 
as the smaller street cash merchants that may be entering the market now. Abroad, cash 
merchants that facilitate remittances via the M-PESA system also need not perform registration 
functions or be branded as an M-PESA agent.   
Transferring money 
Poor people often transport their money themselves or give it to friends or to a bus driver to take 











reliability and integrity of the transport mechanism.  Prudential regulation is not required for the 
pure transport function any more than it is for the post office or companies like DHL.  The 
equivalent  to  the  mail  in  electronic  systems  is  the  telecommunications  platform  and  the 
telecommunications  provider  may  be  subject  to  special  regulations  arising  from  consumer 
protection and competition policy concerns, but specific financial regulation is not required for 
the movement of money across physical distance.   
A special case arises when money is moved across national borders.  This may be of concern 
where monetary authorities seek to implement some form of control on the movement of capital.  
The reason for concern is not that the physical transport risks require prudential regulation but 
that local currency may be exchanged into foreign currency.  Currency control regulations may 
thus be an issue and restrict the transfer of BEM across borders but in practice the amount being 
transferred in systems like M-PESA tend to be below the limits imposed on the transfer of cash 
or other assets for capital control purposes.  
An important feature that mobile payments makes clear is that the payments system can occur 
entirely outside of the banking system.  People communicate directly with each other regarding 
payments  and  receipts  and  an  accounting  system  for  recording  debits  and  credits  operates 
independently of banks.  There is no requirement for payments to be channeled through a central 
clearing system.  The advantage of this is that it avoids the operation of a banking cartel to clear 
payments and receipts; it is instantaneous and not subject to the delays of bank clearing systems; 
and it allows participants to receive immediate records of transactions that enhance trust in the 
conduct of the parties to a transaction and the organization facilitating the transaction.  The 
bypassing  of  bank  clearing  arrangements  is  therefore  a  fundamental  advantage  of  a  mobile 
payments system.   
The transfer of money requires not just transportation.  It requires someone to take the money out 
of an account and to place it in someone else’s account.  When a depositor writes a check they 











account of the recipient.  They may issue the same instructions using the internet or a mobile 
phone without use of a check.    The account provider of the sender needs to authenticate the 
instruction and adjust the sender’s account and the account provider of the recipient needs to 
receive authenticated communication that the account is to be credited.  The account owners 
involved need to be informed about whether the instructions have been carried out and they need 
to receive verification.  Systems are thus required to insure the integrity of this process including 
identification of the parties involved and, depending on the degree of integrity sought, special 
passwords and other identifiers may be required.  To protect information “in transit” varying 
degrees of encryption may be required and measures to prevent and detect attempts to steal 
information, for example, via hacking
8.  Over and above normal contractual relations, the form 
of regulation that is required in relation to transportation is therefore conduct of business.   
Prudential regulation is not required.  
Investing money 
The exchange of money, safe-keeping and transfer can all happen without involving lending or 
other investment.  Money may simply be stored in the equivalent of a safe-deposit box, for 
example, an electronically maintained account.   In this case, the money of depositors is not 
invested and not subject to any investment risk.  We may call the account provider who collects 
the  deposits  a  “deposit-taking”  institution,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  there  is  a  need  for 
prudential regulation as there is for banks, provided the deposits are not invested
9.  Prudential 
banking regulation applies to “deposit-investing” institutions, not to purely deposit-taking ones.  
This is an important issue that is as relevant to developed as developing economies and to which 
we will return in the final section. 
In the case of M-PESA depositors are remunerated as if the money was kept in the electronic 
equivalent of a safe-deposit box, namely not at all.  They bear the risk of loss of value through 
inflation and do not receive interest.  They bear the cost of transferring and withdrawing money.  











keep the net amount of deposits it holds in the equivalent of a box in which case there would be 
no investment risk associated with payments system.  Depositors would hold BEMs, M-PESA 
would  hold  the  equivalent  amount  of  cash  and  there  would  be  no  risk  associated  with 
withdrawals.   
In practice, M-PESA invests its net balances in a bank.  This was done, because the company in 
consultation with the Central Bank felt that it would be safe
10.  Interest on deposits was not 
foreseen originally, because nobody expected that the amounts would be significant bu t today 
annual interest of the order of 7.5 million dollars is earned.
11  The Central Bank has now asked 
M-PESA to diversify investment by depositing the money in two banks and has decreed that the 
interest should be paid to charity
12.   
Compared to a model, where the account provider keeps deposit in a safe-deposit box, M-PESA 
does therefore perform a rudimentary lending function as banks are free to on -lend the deposits 
from the M-PESA trust.  The risk of such an investment is thus equivalent to the risk of a deposit 
in banks that are subject to supervision by the relevant regulator.  M -PESA acts mainly as a 
conduit of deposits for banks is and subject to prudential rules, namely to invest money only in 
safe instruments in a somewhat diversified set of regul ated banks.  Beyond this no prudential 
regulation is required as bank regulation is meant to capture any risk -taking by the banks.  M-
PESA deposits are as good as those in a bank. 
In countries where banks are not desirable as hosts it may be preferable not  to store money in 
banks but to choose the equivalent of a safe -deposit box managed by the account provider or a 
special custodian.  Where deposit in banks is allowed or required, regulation may limit deposit 
options to the safest of instruments and insist  on some level of diversification among investee 
banks. When deposits are kept in the equivalent of a safe -deposit box there is no possibility of 
bank runs.  When deposits collected by an account provider are invested in a bank that in turn 
lends out the deposits, there is a possibility that the depositors in the account provider play a role 











payments system with banking.  Payments systems could be entirely safe and subject to neither 
the risk of particular banks nor systemic failures of several banks.   
The following table summarizes  the risks and minimum forms  of regulation  required of the 
different components of a mobile payments system: 




Exchange  Fraud  No, just commercial 
law 
No 
Storage  Inaccurate records, 
Theft 
Yes, including 
regulation of agents 
No 
Transfer  Transmission errors, 
Accounting errors 
Yes  No 
Investment  Investment  failures, 
Systemic risks 
Yes  Yes 
 
4.  Competition Issues 
M-PESA was launched by Safaricom, Kenya’s telecommunications provider with a market share 
of some 80 percent of the telecommunications market.  M-PESA, in turn, built an exclusive 
network of currently 23,000 cash merchants that also provide account opening services for M-
PESA. Traditional banks lost market share in retail payment services, even though payments 
through  M-PESA  currently  account  for  just  2  %  of  all  payments  by  value  flowing  through 
Kenya’s settlement system.  The dominant position of M-PESA in its market segment has given 
rise to concerns about excessive market power.  In this section, arguments about real and alleged 











As in the discussion on regulation above, the case of M-PESA provides a useful reference point 
to explore more general issues of competition policy in payments. 
The value of both telecommunication and payment networks grows as the number of participants 
increases.    A  new  customer  conveys  a  benefit  to  an  old  customer  by  virtue  of  joining  the 
network, providing a network externality. A money transfer service that services only two small 
villages is of lesser interest than one that connects all major towns and villages. It may also be 
possible that a larger network has lower unit cost per service provided.  Both network effects on 
value  and  cost  of  service  mean  that  networks  have  to  some  degree  naturally  monopoly 
characteristics.  This implies that one large company may be the most efficient way of providing 
the service.  Alternatively, interconnection protocols between different providers may be able to 
reap the benefits of network externalities, if not necessarily the cost advantages.   
In a mobile payment system like that in Kenya, network effects with natural monopoly potential 
arise in the underlying telecommunications market and in the provision of the payment platform. 
Consider  first  telecommunications.  In  most  countries,  just  a  couple  of  decades  ago, 
telecommunications services were still granted legal protection to protect their monopoly against 
new entrants to prevent inefficient duplication of network infrastructure. The Philippines at one 
stage  provided  a  rare  example  of  where  competing  companies  offered  fixed-line  telephone 
service. People needed to conclude contracts with all the firms and maintain multiple phones if 
they wanted to be able to call all others with a phone.  Today, the default setting is to allow entry 
into the telecommunications business but to require interconnection among service providers.  
Kenya is a case in point; the telecom regulator requires interconnection and sets access charges 
between telecommunication networks.  Hence the basic policy to promote competition exists and 
so does the regulatory system to implement it.  Competing mobile telephony providers can enter 
the market and are free to offer phones with SIM cards or other solutions.   
For such a mobile payment mechanism to function customers need to be able to exchange cash 











both  forms  of  money.    The  system  will  only  take  off,  if  the  merchants  are  there  and  the 
merchants, in turn, will only be there, if the system takes off.  This “chicken and egg” situation 
arises in industries that need a critical scale of complementary services.  For example, in the 
early days of the gas and electricity industry, energy providers also offered household appliances 
such as stoves that could be fired with the new energy source.  Without the appliances, there 
would have been insufficient demand.  Gas and electricity networks exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics  on  grounds  of  marginal  costs  falling  with  size.  However,  the  complementary 
business of making and selling stoves is not a natural monopoly but a complement that can 
eventually be provided in competitive markets independent of the energy companies.  So it is 
with cash merchants: competing cash merchants may offer their services, but to get the market to 
develop in the first place, M-PESA felt the need to establish a cash merchant network in parallel 
with providing accounts and transfer services.   
Today,  anyone  with  an  M-PESA  account  can  in  principle  provide  cash-in/cash-out  services.  
Such cash merchants can, in turn, seek the requisite liquidity in cash and BEM balances from 
their bank. But independent cash merchants may not register new M-PESA customers and it 
remains to be seen whether such independent merchants will emerge.
13 Moreover, any new (non-
bank) firm offering payment services is free to set up a distribution network to compete with that 
of M-PESA. In fact, several telecommunications companies are currently pursuing varying 
solutions, including Airtel under the brand name ZAP and Orange in con junction with Equity 
Bank.  These telecommunication companies have the resource base to fund the set -up of new 
distribution networks, if they choose to.  Each is pursuing a different approach to developing a 
mobile payment mechanism; for example, ZAP charg es for transfers only, not for deposits or 
withdrawals and leaves that to cash merchants who need to be paid directly by customers, and 
not via the account provider as in the case of M-PESA. 
In Kenya, non-bank companies like M-PESA are allowed to conclude exclusive agreements with 
the members of their distribution network.  This helps them provide a customer experience that 











not allowed to require exclusivity from their agents and further restrictions apply, for example, 
that the agent must have other businesses than banking, say, a petrol station or a retail store. This 
constrains banks unduly. Entry into the distribution network can be competitive since there is no 
(local) natural monopoly involved as one might argue for in the case of supermarkets in some 
circumstances.  It is hard to see how a new bank distribution network is truly attractive when any 
other account provider can piggyback on the facilities.  To compensate the investing bank for its 
costs and risks, regulators might, of course, decide to set “access prices” for use of agents by 
other account providers but, as discussed below, this would seem unnecessarily cumbersome and 
impractical for now.   
When customers have accounts with different providers, interconnection issues arise.  In the case 
of M-PESA the basic system transfers BEM only between account holders at M-PESA.  It is 
possible to send money to a person who does not have an account with M-PESA but that means 
an SMS is sent from an account holder to, say, a relative without an account.  The relative then 
goes to an M-PESA cash merchant and the SMS provides a code that authorizes the merchant to 
transfer money from the sender’s account to herself.  She then pays out the equivalent amount in 
cash to the designated recipient.  The BEM is only transferred within the M–PESA accounting 
system.   
People in Kenya can also move money from bank account to bank account by transferring it first 
from their bank account to M-PESA, from there to another M-PESA account holder and from 
there to that person’s account in a bank. The process may be cumbersome and costly, but it is 
already a basic option for interconnection of accounts.  The fear of the banks is that the costs of 
the system will lead more and more users to desert them and just use M-PESA. Banks, like 
Equity Bank, which count money transfer as one of their major business lines, are, indeed, under 
some threat.  If such banks cannot improve on M-PESA’s business model, their response may 
need  to  focus  on  services  that  M-PESA  cannot  offer,  notably  lending  and  other  investment 
services.   While, the current system does not provide for direct transfers between bank accounts 











agree to adhere to a payments platform that enables this.  The platform could be provided by a 
consortium of banks or a third party provider, possibly M-PESA.  
A range of competing solutions for alternative payment platforms is conceivable.  The account 
providers that are party to the system need to agree on protocols that govern authentication, 
verification, encryption etc.  The processes would be enabled by features on the technology 
devices that support the system.   If one wants to work with a combination of magnetic strip 
cards and point of sale (POS) terminals, the challenge is like that of credit cards belonging to a 
system such as VISA or Master Card issued by different banks.  If one wants to use mobile 
phones the supporting software could be embedded in the SIM card of a “traditional” mobile 
phone.
14 Alternatively, phones could dial into a system interconnecting the account providers, for 
example, using USSD protocols, the equivalent of using an SMS for messages; for example, 
some banks in Kenya are trying to develop such a system right now to compete with M -PESA. 
This would be less secure than using SIM cards and may suffer from i nterruptions in phone 
service thus leading to aborted/incomplete transactions.  When new smart phones become 
affordable, applications (applets) could be loaded onto the phones that interconnect all account 
providers that agree to the required standards of  an application provider.  This then raises other 
forms of concern about hacking into applets or phishing.  The smart phone solution, in particular, 
shows that the platform for interconnecting account providers can be completely unbundled both 
from them and the telecommunications company.  In Kenya, as elsewhere, the market is open for 
such competing mobile payments solutions.  
Voluntary interconnection between account providers is feasible, but it may not happen, because 
of diverging business interests.  For example, M-PESA has built out a new system including cash 
merchants at great expense and it would need to be compensated for the costs incurred when 
providing access to its own systems.  Negotiations about access to the system may simply fail 
because the parties cannot agree on the required system changes and charges for access to the 
platform.  Nevertheless, M-PESA has entered into collaboration with Equity Bank in Kenya.  











and loan products via the M-PESA account system and cash merchant network that M-PESA 
itself cannot provide.  Strains have, however, arisen as Equity Bank is also collaborating with 
Orange in its own branches. It remains unclear whether Equity Bank can effectively leverage M-
PESA’s distribution network and how to avoid extra regulatory complications when M-PESA 
cash merchants play a role in offering bank products. 
The question for policymakers and regulators is whether to impose rules on market participants 
that lead to greater connection among account providers or whether to let matters develop so as 
not  to  interfere  with  incentives  to  innovate  given  the  rapid  technical  developments  and  the 
difficulty in assessing fully the consequences of regulatory action.   
Regulators have two basic potential tools: setting standards for interconnection and mandating 
interconnection. Setting standards based on currently existing technology is possible.  Yet, by the 
time agreement is reached, technology will have moved on.  Standards would thus need to be 
technology-neutral as best as possible focusing only on basic requirements for authentication, 
communication protocols and verification.  While, it may be hard to foresee all the issues that 
may  arise  when  new  technology  enables  completely  new  ways  of  conducting  business,  an 
ongoing process of consultation between regulators and private providers would seem useful.    
Mandating interconnection can happen in two ways.  Regulators may set interconnection charges 
or they may unbundle the provision of platform services from the provision of accounts.  Doing 
so  is  hard  in  practice.    Setting  interconnection  charges  among  competing  account  providers 
(“two-way access pricing”) is conceptually hard.  Theory exists only for relatively simple cases 
and even if it was clear conceptually, it would be hard to agree on costs and the unavoidable 
discretion involved in allocating them across different services.  In a case like M-PESA, setting 
the  access  price  involves  cost  estimation  and  allocation  judgments  across  the 
telecommunications business and the account provider.  It thus raises issues of where the domain 
of the telecom regulator intersects with that of the regulator for the account provider.  If the 











In payment systems it is not unusual to find competing public or private payment mechanisms 
but  nowhere  have  regulators  forced  banks  to  unbundle  payment  platforms  (Holthausen  and 
Rochet,  2003)
15. Mandated interconnection and associated access price regulation remains a 
controversial topic worldwide. In the end there needs to be a judgment whether the complexity of 
a regulated solution for interconnection is worth the risk of undermining progress alr eady 
achieved and stifling further innovation.  So far, only one country, Kenya, has achieved break -
through progress.  It is hard to argue that tough regulatory action is needed to solve the “luxury” 
problem of perfect mobile interconnection of all account providers. In a market with fast-moving 
technological solutions, the main check on market power may best come from new disruptive 
technologies rather than from attempts to limit market power through regulation or anti-trust 
policies. 
Firms eyeing the mobile payment market need to have incentives to try out new solutions and to 
invest in distribution networks.  If they can expect that, once successful, they will be forced to 
share their success with others without being sure that they are adequately compensated for their 
investment as well as the risks they incurred then they might be unwilling to invest in the first 
place.   Moreover, mobile technology is evolving very fast by any historical standard.  More 
likely than not, a few years from now, new superior competing solutions will be found and 
compete with the early movers like M-PESA.  Successful early entrants may obtain high returns 
for a few years, but that may be necessary to compensate them both for the original risk they 
took and the fact that they bet on a solution that will be outmoded just a few years later.  The 
core tool of competition policy for mobile money systems is entry by new competitors.  What is 
clearly counterproductive is legal barriers to new entry, for example, in the form of exclusivity 
periods for incumbent providers.  Free entry provides the strongest incentives to develop new 
business models if entrants can devise their own pricing structures.    
Pricing services for poor people may attract special scrutiny and views about a fair price may 
push regulators to interfere with commercial decisions.  One view holds that the poor should not 











PESA the costs of sending and withdrawing money may in a number of cases reach or exceed 10 
percent  of the amounts  sent,  a high price but,  judging by demand, clearly  cheaper than the 
alternative.   
M-PESA’s prices for individual services are not individually cost-based, but seem related to 
demand. For example, there is no charge for depositing money. The fee for withdrawing money 
pays for the cost of the checking account.  Many people see this as acceptable or fair as they 
associate the withdrawal fee with the transport fee they would otherwise have to pay.  It could 
also be efficient as deposit-making is discretionary (“elastic”), whereas withdrawing funds may 
be a necessity (“inelastic”) to meet payment obligations.   Such pricing structures may well be 
the most efficient way to offer service. 
Competition  limits  the  scope  for  demand-based  pricing.    As  one  company  raises  prices  for 
inelastic  customers,  another  company  can  offer  the  same  service  at  prices  closer  to  cost.  
Competition  thus  limits  demand-based  pricing  and  combines  considerations  of  fairness  and 
efficiency in a flexible manner without price regulation.   It is tempting for regulators under 
political  pressure  to  interfere  in  commercial  pricing  decisions  but  the  cost  may  be  reduced 
access.    Both  price  ceilings  of  some  sort  and  regulation  aiming  at  cost-based  pricing  can 
undermine the goal of achieving financial inclusion. 
5.  Conclusions 
The  example  of  M-PESA  in  Kenya  has  demonstrated  the  power  of  unbundling  traditional 
banking services in order to reach poor people.  The fundamental choice for policymakers and 
regulators is whether to allow such unbundling to proceed and what regulatory intervention, if 
any, is necessary.  By allowing M-PESA to  experiment, Kenyan regulatory authorities have 
provided a great deal of insight into new possibilities and consequences for regulation.   
What mobile banking illustrates in a stark form is the way in which payments systems can be 











Regulation  should  mirror  this  and  be  structured  by  service  rather  than  along  traditional 
institutional lines, like a bank.  The question then is what type of regulation is appropriate for 
each type of service.  
Cash merchants provide cash-in/cash-out services by exchanging cash for BEM.  They trade with 
their  own  property  and  do  not  impose  risks  that  are  different  from  other  types  of  normal 
merchants.    Reliance  on  normal  commercial  law  governing  merchant  transactions  may  be 
appropriate and pure cash merchants should be free to enter the market and charge market-based 
fees for their services without special regulation. 
Concepts like “agents” need to be treated with care.  In traditional bank regulation, the use of the 
word “agent” tends to imply coverage by banking regulation.  In unbundled systems, principals 
may  contract  with  agents  to  carry  out  functions  on  behalf  of  the  principal.    The  regulatory 
treatment  will  be  dependent  on  that  of  the  principal  and  if  the  principal  does  not  perform 
functions which require prudential regulation then nor do agents. By the same token, agents may 
need to be covered by special regulations when this is required for the function they fulfill on 
behalf of the principal. 
Account providers offer safe-keeping and transfer services.  System integrity is an issue.  This 
may entail disclosure requirements, including, for example, standards for informing depositors 
about balances held and transactions carried out, and regulators may review system operations 
with a view to supporting integrity.  Prudential regulation is not warranted as long as account 
providers do not invest deposits.  When account providers delegate certain functions like opening 
accounts, regulators may require rules assuring operational integrity.  For example, M-PESA 
delegated identity checks for account opening to cash merchants and these are subject to rules 
which regulators need to review. Platform providers link different account providers and allow 
their customers to transfer money from accounts with one provider to accounts with another.  
Here again operational risk is crucial and regulators may need to inspect operational integrity.  











Conduits for deposits (or deposit aggregators) collect deposits and invest them in banks. Here a 
basic level of prudential regulation is required.  Regulators may need to determine the types of 
assets the deposits can be invested in, for example, only low risk deposits at banks.  Regulators 
may also determine which banks are eligible and impose diversification requirements so that 
funds are spread over several banks.  Regulators need to take a view on whether interest earned 
on  bank  deposits  can  benefit  the  depositors  of  the  conduit.    In  principle,  this  seems 
unproblematic and it could be reflected in payment of interest or lower fees.  Policymakers can 
also decide whether to make small deposits that end up in banks via conduits subject to deposit 
insurance, including deposit insurance fees.  
The processes of exchange and transfer raise particular sets of issues concerning interoperability 
between  different  service  providers  that  are  distinct  from  transmission  involving  telecoms.  
Competition  is  critical  for  ensuring  that  services  are  provided  at  lowest  cost  but  the 
determination of costs of interconnection is complex and if imposed too rigidly and early may 
discourage the upfront investments that are required to encourage innovation and the entry of 
new providers.   
Investment  in  technology  platforms  for  storage  of  information  regarding  accounts  and 
transactions  that  are  separate  from  the  mobile  providers  may  facilitate  the  determination  of 
interconnection rules that are simpler than those associated with a bundled supply of account and 
transmission systems.  However, the imposition of interconnection rules in relation to specific 
technologies may discourage investment in these new technologies. 
In general, it will be efficient to allow relative prices for various payment related services to be 
set on the basis of demand.  Furthermore, it may be efficient at least in the short-run to allow 
consumer  surpluses  to  be  exploited  to  finance  upfront  investments.    In  the  longer  term  as 
technologies become established then a move to cost-based pricing in the aggregate (but not for 
relative prices) may be appropriate but an excessively rapid shift in that direction may delay the 











A special case is the development of cash exchange outlets.  So long as cash remains a critical 
part of the system then the establishment of a network of cash merchants to exchange cash and 
BEMs will be central to the functioning of the payments system.  A network is both expensive 
and time consuming to develop and the ability of service providers to have exclusive relations 
with  merchants  may  be  necessary  for  them  to  invest  in  the  creation  of  such  networks.    A 
requirement for competitors to be able to access a merchant network on particular terms or for 
merchants to act as agents of more than one service provider may limit the development of the 
agency network. We thus question policies that restrict exclusivity of agent networks. Moreover, 
new  entrants  into  the  account  provision  and  transfer  market  are  always  free  to  establish 
competing networks and anyone can, in principle, set up a merchant business.  
When services are unbundled and no longer part of a traditional bank the question arises as to 
which  organization  should  regulate  them.    Financial  regulators  are  the  most  competent  for 
banking and financial services, and depending on the country prudential regulation and business 
conduct regulation may be under the same roof or carried out by different agencies (the “twin-
peak” model of regulation).  However, where competition issues arise in network industries, it is 
typically  sensible  to  allocate  responsibility  to  sector-specific  regulators.    Special  rulings  on 
matters like interconnection pricing and rulings on exclusivity arrangements may be better made 
by sector-specific regulators that have a grasp of the technical and organizational intricacies of 
the problem at hand.  In some cases the regulatory system may require co-ordination between 
several  different  sector-specific  regulators,  for  example  when  co-coordinating  registration 
requirements for SIM cards and accounts.  Most of the time, rulings by telecom regulators on 
competition issues in the telecom network and rulings on competition in the payments network 
by financial regulators can be made separately but some level of consultation about the nature 
and timing of decisions may be required.  
Beyond  financial  inclusion,  the  M-PESA  experiment  provides  important  insights  into  the 
regulation of financial services in developed economies.  There is an active debate in the UK and 











whether commercial banking should be regulated as a utility and required to invest in low risk 
assets  distinct  from  investment  banking.    One  of  the  arguments  for  this  is  that  commercial 
banking is the beneficiary of publicly provided deposit insurance and should not be used to 
cross-subsidize  investment  banking.    A  second  argument  is  that  in  the  event  of  failures,  as 
observed in many countries around the world over the last few years, governments are frequently 
called upon to bail out their banks.  This comes at the expense of taxpayers and not only should 
the likelihood of this be minimized by limiting the degree of risks taken by banks but in addition 
the core parts of the banking that need to be rescued should be separated from the remainder so 
that special resolution procedures are easier to implement.   
The issue that mobile banking in Kenya raises is what is meant by the core part of banking.  
What  M-PESA  clearly  demonstrates  is  that  a  payments  system  can  operate  entirely 
independently  of  a  banking  system.    Indeed  given  the  cheapness,  speed,  convenience  and 
transparency of payments transacted by mobile phones, it is very likely that in due course similar 
technologies will replace the bank clearing systems that exist in developed economies.  The 
borrowing  and  lending  functions  of  banks  can  therefore  occur  independently  of  payments.  
Individuals  can  have  access  to  payments  and  custody  systems  without,  as  this  article  has 
demonstrated the need for prudential regulation.   The payment system can therefore be operated 
with virtually no risk to the tax payer.  With the mobile payments system offering full liquidity 
and security outside of the banking system, the conventional functions of banks of performing 
liquidity and maturity transformation become less critical for the financial system as a whole.  
Individuals can allocate some of their savings to transactions outside of the banking system and 
then determine their savings in more illiquid and longer assets separately.  In other words, the 
public good aspect of banking, namely the payments and safe custody functions are removed 
from banking and operated by other service providers that have little or no risk associated with 
them.  This suggests that not only does mobile banking clarify the nature of financial regulation 
in developing countries but it also sheds important light on the real sources of market failure and 
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2 The data reflect information available at January 12-14, 2011 
3 The way people are using M-PESA is analyzed in Jack and Suri, 2010. 
4 New draft regulations on electronic retail transfers issued by the Kenyan Central Bank in  February 2011 use the 
term “cash merchant”. 
5 SIM cards are the Subscriber Identification Modules of GSM phones. 
6 Generic regulatory issues for mobile payment schemes are discussed in Lyman, Pickens and Porteous, 2008, 
Porteous, 2009, Tarazi and Brefloff 2010, Dias and McKee, 2010 and  Alexandre, Mas and Radcliffe, 2011. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a broader report on microfinance activities in August 2010. 
7 In the case of M-PESA the company itself may have a business interest to establish identity so as to ascertain that 
an individual who wants to send money to a recipient pays this into her own account rather than the account of the 
recipient, which would avoid the transfer fee. 
8 Makin, 2009 explains how M-PESA adopted good practices of credit card schemes to ensure adequate encryption 
9 In a similar vein the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states in its report on “Microfinance activities and 
the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” (August, 2010): "As long as …the [cash] collateral is not 
intermediated, there is no risk to the “depositor” and this activity should not trigger prudential oversight.”   
10 For an account of the genesis of M-PESA viewed from the perspective of the Central Bank of Kenya see Kimenyi 
and Ndung’u, 2009. 
11 Oral communication by Michael Joseph, former CEO of Safaricom, January 12, 2011. 
12 Kenya’s new regulation of e-money requires non-bank account providers not to pay interest, but gives them the 











                                                                                                                                                             
 
13Such merchants have emerged outside Kenya where they facilitate cross-border remittance payments using M-
PESA. 
14This would put the telecom company that controls the SIM card in the driver’s seat. At some future date it is 
conceivable  that  the  SIM  card  itself  would  be  an  unbundled  platform  with  access  rights  beyond  the 
telecommunication company (Makin, 2009). 
15Brazil has mandated a limited form of interconnection of payment platforms by requiring all banks to accept a 
special payment instrument.  This instrument may also be used by authorized retail outlets that perform cash -
in/cash-out functions.  In Brazil, the cash merchants are set up as agents of banks and use points of sale (POS) 
terminals, not mobile phones. A retail agent for one bank c an thus effect payments to and from the account of 
another bank. 